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I.

INTRODUCTION

State public utility commissions should have the authority to regulate
transactions between public utilities and their parent companies, subsidiaries or
other affiliated corporations. In the absence of such authority, a public utility
can (1) arrange transactions with affiliated entities that result in the utility overpaying for goods or services, thereby increasing rates, or (2) take on financial
burdens attributable to affiliated entities, which can threaten its solvency. In its
report on Enron's fraudulent financial transactions, the staff of the United
States Senate Committee on Government Affairs explained:
[W]henever a company conducts transactions among its own affiliates there are
inherent issues about the fairness and motivations of such transactions .... One

concern is that where one affiliate in a transaction has captive customers, a one-sided
deal between affiliates can saddle those customers with additional financial burdens.
Another concern is that one affiliate will treat another with favoritism 1at the expense
of other companies or in ways detrimental to the market as a whole.

The root of the problem, as noted by a former California Supreme Court
Justice, is that agreements between a public utility and its affiliates are not
"made at arm's length or on an open market. They are between corporations,
one of which is controlled by the other. As such they are subject to suspicion
and therefore present dangerous potentialities."'
The potential dangers of interaffiliate transactions first became apparent
early in the twentieth century following the formation of public utility holding
* J.D. Candidate for 2004, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; former member of the Nevada
Public Utilities Commission. The author would like to give special thanks to Professor
Robert Lawless for his helpful guidance.
I STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., COMMITTEE STAFF INVESTIGATION OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION'S OVERSIGHT OF ENRON 26,
n.75 (Nov. 12, 2002) [hereinafter STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS].
2 Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 215 P.2d 441, 449 (Cal. 1950) (Carter, J.,
dissenting).

Fall 2003]

SHUTTING THE BARN DOOR

companies.3 At that time, "[h]olding companies were taking advantage of the
fact that they owned utilities in multiple states to engage in interstate, intracompany transactions that could not be controlled by state public utility commissions."4 In response, Congress passed the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, which gave the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
authority to regulate interstate public utility holding companies5 and the Federal Power Act, which gave the Federal Power Commission the authority to
regulate the rates that one utility could charge another.6 Many states also
passed legislation during this time period that authorized their public utility
commissions to review certain transactions between utility companies and their
affiliates. 7
Even with these state and federal attempts to oversee transactions between
regulated entities and their affiliates over the years, the difficulties in controlling such transactions still persist. A recent online version of the Wall Street
Journal noted that energy companies "burned by disastrous forays into commodities trading. . ." were attempting to recoup some of their losses by passing
part of their financial burdens on to their affiliated utility units.8 As a result,
utilities bought assets from affiliates, made loans to their affiliates, or passed
3 "Holding companies are corporations organized for the purpose of acquiring and holding

the stock of other corporations. Corporations that engage in business activities and only
incidentally hold majority stock in another corporation are not holding companies." Joan G.
Fickinger, Jurisdictionof State Regulatory Commissions Over Public Utility Holding Company Diversification, 15 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 87, 87 n.3 (citing 6A W. FLETCHER, CYCOLPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 2821 (1981)). "[Tjhe dominant characteristic of a

holding company is the ownership of securities by which it is possible to control or substantially to influence the policies and management of one or more operating companies in a
particular field of enterprise." Id. (citing N. Am. Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 327 U.S.
686, 701 (1945)).
4 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, at 5.
1 James W. Moeller, Requiem for the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: The
"Old" Federalism and State Regulation of Inter-State Holding Companies, 17 ENERGY L.J.
343, 343 (1996). The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 is codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 79-79z-6 (2000). This note does not discuss the Securities and Exchange Commission's
("SEC") regulation of interstate public utility holding companies. Not all holding companies, however, are subject to SEC regulation. A holding Company whose interests and business are predominantly intrastate is exempt from the registration requirements of the Act per
15 U.S.C. § 79c(a)(1) as are "companies 'predominantly' engaged in public utility operations that are confined to single states and those states contiguous thereto" per U.S.C.
§ 79c(a)(2). Id. at 353 nn.80, 81.
6 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 5. The Federal Power Act
is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 791a-828c (2000). The Federal Power Commission was the predecessor to the current Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). Id. FERC is "an
independent five-member regulatory commission within the Department of Energy ...[that]
regulates the interstate transmission and wholesale sale of electricity and natural gas ...
[and] also licenses hydroelectric projects and regulates the transmission of oil by interstate
pipelines." Id. at 4.
7 Legislation: The Servicing Function of Public Utility Holding Companies, 49 HARv. L.
REV. 957, 986 (1934) [hereinafter The Servicing Function].
8 Rebecca Smith, Beleaguered Energy Firms Try to Share Pain with Utility Subsidiaries,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2002, at Al (referring to Duke Energy's transfer of expenses from its
nonutility affiliates into its utilities to reduce the possibility of customer refunds as one of the
"clearest examples of a lack of firewalls" between utilities and their unregulated affiliates).
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more money on to their parent companies by reducing capital spending. 9 Recognizing that utilities were subject to manipulation by their parent companies,
credit-rating agencies reduced the utilities' debt ratings, thus raising the costs of
borrowing money or refinancing debt for the utilities, with the potential that
these higher costs would eventually be passed on to electric consumers.' °
A.

Enron and FERC

The most notorious examples of inappropriate interaffiliate transactions
are those Enron arranged shortly before its collapse in 2001.
In November
2001, Enron attempted to avoid bankruptcy by securing loans for $1 billion on
two pipeline subsidiaries, which were secured by the pipelines' assets. 1 2 The
proceeds of the loans were subsequently transferred to Enron as unsecured
loans from the pipelines.' 3 After declaring bankruptcy a few weeks later,
Enron made no payments on these loans, leaving the pipelines to pay off the
entire amount.' 4 As noted in the Senate Government Affairs Committee staff
report, "ordinarily such costs would be passed on to shippers
who use the pipe' 5
lines, and ultimately to retail natural gas customers."'
In addition, some Enron subsidiaries also had "cash management agreements" with Enron, whereby, at the end of each day, all remaining cash in the
subsidiaries was transferred to Enron, which held and invested it, with no indication that the interest earnings were properly credited back to the subsidiaries.' 6 Enron made "more extensive use" of this common industry practice than
did other companies, holding an average of $195 million from associated companies compared to non-Enron companies holding an average of $6 million.' 7
Furthermore, the average amount transferred into Enron's accounts receivable
from associated companies grew from $44 million in 1997 to approximately
$195 million in 2000.18
There was also evidence that "Enron may have used its public utility affiliate, Portland General Electric (PGE), to engage in the questionable export and
reimportation of electricity from California during the Western energy crisis of
2000-2001 and disguised these prohibited interaffiliate transactions."' 9 ConId.
10 Id.
9

STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON Gov'T AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining that on
December 2, 2001, Enron, then the nation's seventh largest company, filed for bankruptcy
protection amid allegations of financial and other fraud. Enron's collapse left thousands
unemployed, erased billions of dollars of shareholder value and triggered crises, not only in
investor confidence in U.S. financial markets, but in consumer and investor confidence in the
energy markets as well).
12 Id. at 3.
1'Id. at 28 n.82 (explaining that the proceeds were exchanged for "promissory notes that
stated they were subordinated to prior payment of all senior indebtedness upon the dissolution, liquidation or reorganization of Enron.").
14 Id. at 28.
"

15
16

Id.
Id. at 29.

17 Id. at 29 n.89.
18 Id. at 29 n.90.
'9

id.at 3.
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cluding there was a "shocking absence of regulatory vigilance 20 over Enron's
activities, the Senate Government Affairs Committee reported that the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") 2 1 was "unprepared and unwilling to
act against suspect interaffiliate transactions either because the Commission's
rules were inadequate or because it was not able to effectively monitor whether
companies were complying with the rules."2 2
B.

Western Resources Inc. and the Kansas Corporation Commission

The problems encountered in policing affiliate transactions that shift
financial burdens to regulated utilities - and thus to consumers - are not confined to companies regulated by FERC. 23 A recent example of a state public
utility commission's attempts to regulate transactions, that would have improperly shifted costs to regulated utilities, 2 4 is the Kansas Corporation Commis25

sion's ("KCC") investigation into Western Resources, Inc.'s ("WRI")
proposal to separate its non-regulated affiliates from its public utility businesses. 26 WRI is a public utility holding company that operates Kansas Power
and Light and Kansas Gas and Electric, electric utilities providing retail service

to approximately 636,000 customers in Kansas.2 7 WRI also wholly owns Westar Industries, Inc. ("Westar"), a subsidiary28 that is not regulated by the
KCC.2 9
The KCC, citing its "plenary authority" to supervise and control electric
utilities doing business in Kansas, 3 ° opened its investigation into WRI's pro20

Id. at 2.

FERC is "an independent five-member regulatory commission within the Department of
Energy ... [that] regulates the interstate transmission and wholesale sale of electricity and
21

natural gas... [and] also licenses hydroelectric projects and regulates the transmission of oil
by interstate pipelines." Id. at 4.
22 Id. at 3.
23 FERC did not directly regulate Enron (which was a holding company) as a corporation
per se, but had jurisdiction over many of Enron's energy marketing, generation, and transmission subsidiaries ("Enron identified 24 electricity marketers, generators or transmitters,
15 gas pipelines, and 5 oil pipelines that [were] Enron subsidiaries or affiliates" that were
jurisdictional to FERC and had several other independent generation facilities known as
"qualifying facilities" ("QF's") and exempt wholesale generators ("EWG's"), which were
subject to FERC's jurisdiction or certification requirements). Id. at 7.
24 State utility commissions regulate retail rates charged to consumers for utility services
provided by public utilities within their states. Id. at 5.
25 WRI has since taken the name Westar Energy, Inc. For purposes of clarity, it shall be
referred to here as WRI.
26 Order In the Matter of the Investigation of Actions of Western Resources, Inc. to Separate
its Jurisdictional Electric Public Utility Business from its Unregulated Businesses, No. 01WSRE-949-GIE, at 1 (Kan. Corp. Comm'n July 20, 2001) [hereinafter July 20, 2001 Order].
27 Id. at 2.
28 Id. at 3 (explaining Westar Industries, Inc. is also a holding company "consisting of an 85
percent ownership interest in Protection One, Inc. [an unregulated security monitoring business], 100 percent ownership interest in Protection One Europe, a 45 percent ownership
interest in ONEOK, Inc., approximately 17 percent ownership interest in its parent WRI and
interests in international power plant investments." At the time of the KCC's order, WRI
owned 100 percent of Westar's outstanding common stock).
29 Id.
30 Order Initiating Investigation In the Matter of the Investigation of the Actions of Western
Resources, Inc. to Separate its Jurisdictional Electric Public Utility Business from its Unreg-
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posals after Westar filed a Registration Statement ("Statement") with the
SEC.3 1 The Statement indicated that prior to the proposed split off, Westar and
WRI intended to distribute the holding company's assets and liabilities among
WRI's affiliated entities via an Asset Allocation Agreement ("Agreement")
between the two companies. 32 The KCC staff estimated that consummation of
the Agreement would result in WRI's December 31, 2000 consolidated balance
sheet reflecting 113.02 percent ($2.97 billion) of WRI's long-term debt in its
electric utility businesses and negative equity of 13.02 percent (approximately
$300 million).3 3 Staff estimates further showed that, as of December 31, 2001,
WRI's proposals would result in the transfer $1.6 billion of consolidated debt
from its nonutility businesses (primarily from Protection One, Inc., Westar's
residential and commercial security monitoring subsidiary) to WRI's regulated
utility operations.3 4 If effectuated, the Agreement would cause WRI's equity
to fall from approximately 50 percent of its total capital structure in 1995 ($1.7
billion) to 25 percent of its total capital structure as of December 31, 2001 ($1.8
billion).
WRI's financial condition was further worsened by credit rating downgrades it received in response to an earlier split off proposal, which resulted in
its debt issuances falling from investment grade to junk bond status.36 As a
result, WRI was unable to issue unsecured notes to finance its short-term capital needs and was forced to secure short-term cash by mortgaging its property
ulated Businesses, No. 01-WSRE-949-GIE, at 5-6 (Kan. Corp. Comm'n May 8, 2001)
[hereinafter Order Initiating Investigation] (citing the commission's jurisdiction under KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 66-101 (2000) which provides "[t]he commission is given full power, authority and jurisdiction to supervise and control the electric public utilities ... doing business in
Kansas, and is empowered to do all things necessary and convenient for the exercise of such
power, authority and jurisdiction."; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101h (2000) which provides,
among other things, that "[t]he commission shall have general supervision of all electric
public utilities doing business in this state ... and shall carefully examine and inspect the
condition of each electric public utility ... the manner of its conduct and its management
with reference to the public safety and convenience"; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101d (Supp.
2000) which authorizes the commission to investigate any act or practice of an electric public utility which affects its ability to provide efficient and sufficient service at just and reasonable rates; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-136 (Supp. 2000) which provides that any transaction
constituting a "contract or agreement with reference to or affecting" the certificate of convenience is not valid until approved by the commission; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-1402 (2000)
which provides that any "management ... or similar contract" between a public utility and
its affiliated interests shall not be effective unless approved in advance by the commission).
31 Id. at 2.
32 July 20, 2001 Order, supra note 26, at 3. The Agreement also established that WRI could
repay Westar for cash advances made to WRI via a note receivable to Westar. To decrease
the value owed on the note receivable, WRI later issued its common stock to Westar, thus
allowing Westar to establish an equity ownership position in WRI as its largest stockholder
with seventeen percent of WRI's voting capital stock. Further advances were to be made by
Westar to WRI financed by a proposed rights offering to Westar stockholders. Id.
31 Id. at 9.
3' No. 51 Order Requiring Financial and Corporate Restructuring by Western Resources,
Inc., In the Matter of the Investigation of Actions of Western Resources, Inc. to Separate its
Jurisdictional Electric Utility Business from its Unregulated Businesses, No. 01-WSRE-949GIE, at 6 (Kan. Corp. Comm'n Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter No. 51 Order].
35 Id. at 4-5.
36 Order Initiating Investigation, supra note 30, at 3-4.
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at an interest rate of 10.5 percent 37 - costs which WRI's electric consumers
were at risk of bearing.
There were other questionable interaffiliate transactions as well. For
example, prior to proposing the split off, WRI advanced at least $927 million to
Westar. 38 The advance was originally classified as a loan from WRI to Westar. 3 9 As noted during the KCC's hearings, WRI's management and board of
directors made a "pivotal decision" to reclassify the loan to an investment, thus
transforming $927 million of debt on Westar's books to $927 million of common equity.4 0 In addition, WRI transferred stock it owned in ONEOK, a natural gas company, which it valued at $1 billion in its 2000 Annual Report, to
Westar in advance of filing the split off proposal with the SEC. 4
The KCC concluded that WRI' s split off was designed so that WRI's electric businesses would hold significant amounts of debt at the time of the split
off but no Westar assets, while Westar would own all of WRI's unregulated
assets but would not be responsible for the long-term debt used to acquire
them.4 2 As a result, WRI's asset-poor and debt-laden electric businesses would
likely be forced to pay off the debt either through increases in electric rates or
other cost-cutting measures which would "impair WRI's ability to perform routine maintenance, retain qualified employees or make the necessary capital
improvements to meet the needs of Kansas electric customers." 43 The KCC
ordered WRI to stop the transactions necessary to complete the split off and
found the Asset Allocation Agreement to be "contrary to the public interest and
having no force and effect."" The KCC directed WRI to prepare a plan to
restore WRI's electric utilities to financial health, achieve a balanced capital
structure, and protect ratepayers from the risks of WRI's non-utility
businesses.4 5
WRI requested reconsideration of the KCC's order, arguing that the Kansas affiliated interests statutes did not extend to the Asset Allocation Agreement because it had been filed by Westar, and that the commission was "not
37 Id.

at 4.

38 July 20, 2001 Order, supra note 26, at 7 n.2 (explaining this investment was originally

classified as an intercompany receivable owed by Westar to WRI, but was later reclassified
as an investment in Westar by management).
39 Id.
40

Id. at 8 (footnote omitted).

41 Id. at 2 n.1 (noting WRI originally acquired the stock when it exchanged its natural gas

business at a book value of approximately $594 million for 45 percent ownership interest in
ONEOK, Inc.).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12, 13.
44 Id. at 41-42.
42

43

Id. In a subsequent order, the commission (1) rejected the financial plan proposed by
WRI; (2) directed WRI to reverse certain accounting transactions; (3) directed WRI to transfer its KPL utility division to a utility-only subsidiary of WRI, after review and approval of
WRI's plan to do so by the commission; (4) instituted interim standstill protections to prevent harm to WRI's utility businesses as a result of their affiliation with WRI's nonutility
businesses pending adoption of final requirements relating to such affiliation; and (5) instituted an investigation into the appropriate type, quantity, structure and regulation of the
nonutility businesses with which WRI's utility businesses may be affiliated. No. 51 Order,
supra note 34, at 3-4.
41
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empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the board of directors of the
unregulated subsidiary .. ,46 The KCC denied the petition and WRI subsequently filed for judicial review.47
C.

State Public Utility Commission Authority and Interaffiliate Contracts

Assertions such as those made by WRI are common battle cries used by a
public utility in questioning commission authority over transactions with its
affiliates.4 8 Such assertions raise the question of how far state regulators can
go to stop public utility holding companies, or their unregulated subsidiaries or
affiliates, from harming consumers by "milking their utility units" 49 through
interaffiliate transactions such as those described above.
This note will examine various court decisions involving public utility
commission authority over such transactions, and distill principles from those
46 Order on Reconsideration In the Matter of the Investigation of Actions of Western

Resources, Inc. to Separate its Jurisdictional Electric Utility Business from its Unregulated
Businesses, No. 01-WSRE-949-GIE, 4 (Kan. Corp. Comm'n Oct. 3, 2001) (citing Petition of
Western Resources, Inc. for General Reconsideration of July 20, 2001 Order, and Request
for Clarification and for Notice or Submission of Additional Evidence, at 21 (Aug. 6, 2001)).
47 Initial Brief of Westar Energy, Inc. (WRI), at 4-6 (Aug. 19, 2002) (citing Shawnee Co.
Dist. Ct. Mem. Decision and Order, Case No. 01-C-1190, 6-7 (Feb. 5, 2002) wherein the
court remanded the petition to the KCC pending the outcome of the KCC's review of WRI's
mandated remedial financial plan). In its Initial Brief, WRI reasserted the arguments made
in its Aug. 6, 2001 Petition for Reconsideration. Id. at 22.
48 See e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wyo., 745 P.2d 563,
568 (Wyo. 1987) (observing that management decisions are "entirely that of the utility"
because permitting civil servants to make those determinations instead of management
results in no accountability for those decisions to investors in the business); PNM Elec.
Servs. v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 961 P.2d 147, 152 (N.M. 1988) (affirming that the commission had the authority to require a public utility to provide optional utility services
through an affiliate and that the exercise of such authority was not an invasion of management as argued by the utility company); Midland Cogeneration Venture Ltd. P'ship v. Mich.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 501 N.W.2d 573, 580-81 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding there
was no statutory authority for the Michigan Public Service Commission to regulate an affiliate's accounting and bookkeeping practices, which is a managerial decision); Lone Star Gas
Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 39 P.2d 547, 553 (Okla. 1934) (holding "[tihe powers of the
Commission ...do not extend to an invasion of the discretion vested in corporate management. It does not include the power to approve or disapprove contracts about to be entered
into, nor to the approval or veto of expenditures proposed.").
" Smith, supra note 8. See also The Servicing Function, supra note 7, at 981 (explaining
how transactions between a public utility and its affiliate may negatively impact consumers.
Consumers can be harmed by overpayments for affiliate services made by the utility which
result in a "swelling" of the utility's operating expenses, which can (a) prevent a rate reduction when profits are reviewed to determine whether the utility is making more than a reasonable return, or (b) minimize the return so that only small profits are shown, or none at all,
which then requires a rate increase. Overcharges for capital expenses, such as construction
or engineering services, can broaden the rate base (the value of property used by the utility in
providing service) upon which the utility is entitled to earn a return and increase costs of
operations by increasing the amount annually charged to the utility's depreciation accounts,
thereby increasing the rate required to yield an adequate return.); Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub.
Util. Comm'n, 215 P.2d 441, 449 (Cal. 1950) (Carter, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that if a
"raid on the treasury of the operating utility" results in the utility becoming insolvent, consumers can be harmed because consumers will either have to pay higher financing costs to
acquire the capital necessary for the expansion of service demanded from a utility or higher
operating expenses for a receiver).
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decisions regarding state commission authority to second-guess management
decisions over affiliate transactions. Part II of this note examines early twentieth century Supreme Court decisions regarding state public utility commission
authority over servicing contracts between public utilities and their parent holding companies. Part III reviews state judicial responses to public utility challenges made since those early Supreme Court decisions. Part IV evaluates the
continuing vitality of the "invasion of management" defense, which is frequently asserted by utilities in challenging commission authority over interaffiliate transactions. The conclusion summarizes why commission authority
should be construed to encompass direct regulation of interaffiliate transactions
between public utilities and their parent, subsidiary, or affiliate companies.
H.

EARLY SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REGARDING COMMISSION

AUTHORITY TO INDIRECTLY CONTROL INTERAFFILIATE CONTRACTS

In Munn v. Illinois, the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois statute, that regulated public warehouses and required the inspection of grain, as a legitimate
regulation of private business because that business was "affected with a public
interest."5 ° The Court explained that property became "clothed with a public
interest" when used in a way that affected the community at large. 5 ' Owners of
such property, said the Court, "must submit to be controlled by the public for
the common good," to the extent of the interest created.5"
Utility companies were affected with a public interest and by the 1930's
most state governments had created public utility commissions to oversee
them. 53 A major goal of public utility commissions is to ensure that the utility
rates charged to consumers are "just and reasonable." 54 To accomplish this
goal, state legislatures have generally vested commissions with broad authority
to supervise and regulate public utilities within their states, 55 and courts are
50

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).

51

Id.
Id.

52

53 Fickinger, supra note 3, at 90 (citing C. WILCOX & W. SHEPHERD, PUBLIC POLICIES
TOWARD BUSINESS 334, 354 (5th ed. 1975)).

14

See e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. 704.040(1) (2001) ("Every public utility shall furnish reasonably adequate service and facilities, and the charges made for any service rendered or to be
rendered, or for any service in connection therewith or incidental thereto, must be just and
reasonable"); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301 (2000) ("Every rate made, demanded, or received
by any public utility, or by any two or more public utilities jointly, shall be just and reasonable... ").
11 See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101(2002) which provides "[t]he commission is given
full power, authority and jurisdiction to supervise and control the electric public utilities...
doing business in Kansas, and is empowered to do all things necessary and convenient for
the exercise of such power, authority and jurisdiction."; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101h (2002),
which provides, among other things, that "[t]he commission shall have general supervision
of all electric public utilities doing business in this state... and shall carefully examine and
inspect the condition of each electric public utility ... the manner of its conduct and its
management with reference to the public safety and convenience"; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66101d (2002) which authorizes the commission to investigate any act or practice of an electric
public utility that affects its ability to provide efficient and sufficient service at just and
reasonable rates; 66 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 501(a), (b) (West 2002 ) ("[T]he commission shall
have full power and authority, and it shall be its duty to enforce, execute and carry out, by its
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frequently deferential when commissions exercise that authority in regulating
public utilities. 56
Courts, however, have been more reluctant to affirm commission decisions that attempt to directly regulate transactions between a public utility and
its affiliate or parent corporation. 5 7 Public utility commissions began grappling
with questionable interaffiliate transactions shortly after public utility holding
companies emerged, early in the twentieth century.5 8 Public utility holding
companies were formed, among other reasons, to "satisfy more economically
the needs of small operating companies for highly skilled engineering and management." 5 9 To meet the needs of their operating utilities, holding companies
developed servicing contracts, which "refer[red] to the performance for the
operating utility by another company of any operations regarded as necessary
or desirable for the utility's functioning and which could be performed by a
staff as part of its own organization. "60
The most commonplace servicing contracts were those between local Bell
operating companies and their parent, American Telephone and Telegraph
("AT&T"). 6 ' AT&T's servicing contract included a guarantee by AT&T to not
only furnish its subsidiary with all the instruments necessary to provide tele-

phone service, but also (1) managerial advice regarding public relations, engiregulations, orders, or otherwise, all and singular, the provisions of this part, and the full
intent thereof; and shall have the power to rescind or modify any such regulations or orders.
The express enumeration of the powers of the commission in this part shall not exclude any
power which the commission would otherwise have under any of the provisions of this part";
"The Commission shall have general administrative power and authority to supervise and
regulate all public utilities doing business within this Commonwealth."); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 62-6-4 (LEXIS 2002) ("The Commission shall have general and exclusive power and
jurisdiction to regulate and supervise every public utility in respect to its rates and service
regulations... and to do all things necessary and convenient in the exercise of its power and
jurisdiction.").
56 See e.g., Fairview Water Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 502 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. 1985)
(finding the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission had full power in regulating utility
rates and services, excluding the power of eminent domain); PNM Elec. Servs. v. N.M. Pub.
Util. Comm'n, 961 P.2d 147, 150 (N.M. 1998) (recognizing that the New Mexico Public
Utility Commission possesses expansive regulatory power to broadly and liberally construe
the New Mexico Public Utility Act to effect legislative policies); CURB v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 28 Kan. App. 2d 313, 324-25 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that the vast powers of
the commission should not be construed so narrowly as to defeat the commission's purpose
but should be liberally construed to include every power that can be fairly implied from the
language of the statute and necessary to enable the commission to exercise its express
powers).
57 See e.g., Pac. Tel & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 215 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1950) (finding
the California commission did not have statutory authority to prescribe terms of conditions
of contracts between the utility and its affiliate and that such authority could not be implied
from its general rate-making powers); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of Wyo., 745 P.2d 563, 568 (Wyo. 1987) (rejecting the commission's attempt to
regulate the publication of an advertising directory by a subsidiary of Mountain Bell because
the "PSC is not in a position to take on any aspect of utility management. It must restrict its
position to 'regulation' with management decisions being entirely that of the utility.").
58 The Servicing Function, supra note 7, at 957.
19 Id. at 958.
6 Id. at 959 n. 10.
61 George W. Simpkins, State Regulation of Contracts with Public Utility Affiliates, 20 ST.

Louis L.

REV.

1, 19 (1934).
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neering, construction, research, accounting or the law; (2) licenses under all
patents issued; (3) protection against patent infringement claims; (4) representation of all suits before public utilities commissions, federal commissions or
taxing bodies; and (5) financial assistance to any extent necessary." In return,
AT&T received four and one half percent of the gross income of the subsidiary. 63 The standard percentage charge was later reduced. 64
Servicing contracts raised the original question of state commission
authority over interaffiliate transactions, primarily when it came to setting
rates.6 5 The early conclusions reached by commissions were mixed.66 At least
one state high court, while concluding the commission's exclusion of servicing
contract fees from the utility's operating expenses was not "against the manifest weight of the evidence," nevertheless warned "the commission is not the
financial manager of the corporation, and is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the directors of the corporation . . .67 The question of
whether a commission has authority to value servicing contracts when setting
rates was ultimately answered as part of a series of United States Supreme
Court decisions.
A.

The Competitive Price Test

In 1921, Southwestern Bell sought to enjoin the city of Houston from
enforcing an ordinance that, it alleged, resulted in telephone rates that were too
low.6 8 In deciding that Southwestern Bell could include the cost of its servicing contract with AT&T in rates, the Court noted that Southwestern Bell had
shown that the contract fees were reasonable and "less than the same could be
obtained for from other sources. '"69 The Court also found that AT&T's control
of both Southwestern Bell and the affiliate which provided Southwestern Bell
with its equipment and supplies was "not important beyond requiring close
scrutiny of their dealings to prevent imposition upon the community served by
the Company..70 One commentator lauded this decision as recognizing that
servicing contracts required close scrutiny and that state commissions had the
authority to review the fees charged for such contracts using a competitive
price test.7 ' Another commentator observed, correctly, that the competitive
price test was not a good measure of the reasonableness of such contract
charges because there was no competition then existing in the telephone industry by which competitive prices could be measured.7 2

63

Id.
Id.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 30.
Id.

62

66

Id. at 26. See State Pub. Util. Comm'n ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co.,
125 N.E. 891, 901 (Ill. 1919).

67

69

Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318, 323 (1921).
Id.

70

Id.

71
72

Simpkins, supra note 61, at 31.
The Servicing Function, supra note 7, at 984.

68
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The Good Faith Test

Two years later, in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Commission of Missouri,7 3 the Court concluded that the commission had not allowed the utility to earn a fair return on its investment, which
was a violation of the Southwestern Bell's due process rights. 4 The Court
receded from its previous position and invalidated the commission's disallowance of over half of the servicing contract fees paid by Southwestern Bell to
AT&T. It declared that the four and one-half percent charge on gross revenues
was the customary charge for servicing contracts, and that there was nothing to
indicate bad faith in making the contract between AT&T and its subsidiary. 75
Finding that the utility's board of directors had exercised "a proper discretion about this matter requiring business judgment,"7 6 the Court admonished
the Missouri Public Service Commission not to forget that the state "is not the
owner of the properties of the public utility companies and is not clothed with
the general power of management incident to ownership. 7 7 In issuing its
warning, the Court relied on the "general rule" expressed by the Illinois
Supreme Court that "[t]he commission is not the financial manager of the corporation; nor can it ignore items charged by the utility as operating expenses,
unless there is an abuse of discretion in that regard by the corporate officers. 7 8
The Supreme Court's reliance on the Illinois Supreme Court's earlier warning
was ironic, given that the Supreme Court negated commission action similar to
that affirmed by the Illinois high court. 7 9 The adoption of the Court's newly
articulated good faith standard led one commentator to observe:
[I]t would seem not to matter how excessive the prices paid were compared to the
competitive cost of the services or supplies, provided only the board of directors were
sufficiently stupid or inattentive not to realize that this was a fraud upon their own
corporation. It gives incompetence full privilege to80mismanage the property as it will
and charge the cost of the folly to the consumer.

Many commissions refused to follow the good faith test of Southwestern
Bell. 8 ' They were able to maneuver around the Court's good faith test by finding that no valuable services had been provided in return for the contract payments. They accomplished this in one of two ways.8 2 The commission either
concluded that the affiliate did nothing at all to benefit the operating company8 3
or that the operating company had enough executives to perform the services
covered by the contract instead of relying on the affiliate.8 4
73 262 U.S. 276, 287 (1923).
74 Id.
71 Id. at 288-89.
76

Id.

77 Id.
78 Id.

(citing State Pub. Util. Comm'n ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co.,
125 N.E. 891, 901 (II1. 1919)).
79 See Simpkins, supra note 61, at 26.
80 Id. at 35.
81 Id. at 41.
82 Id.
83 Id.at 41 n.118.
84 Id. at 41 n.119.
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C. Disallowance of UnreasonableServicing Contract Fees
The good faith standard put forth in Southwestern Bell was short-lived. In
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,85 the Illinois Bell Telephone Company
appealed an order by the Illinois Commerce Commission, asserting its telephone rates were too low and violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.8 6 Despite a lower court's findings that the servicing contract was
made in good faith, and the services and supplies were competitively priced,
the Court noted Western Electric Company (AT&T's equipment supply subsidiary) "occupied a special position with particular advantages in relation to the
manufacture and sale of equipment to the licensees of the Bell system, including the Illinois Company. '87 As a result of this special relationship, the Court,
while finding AT&T had rendered valuable services, remanded the case for
more specific findings regarding the cost of the services provided by Western
Electric and the reasonable amount that should be allocated to Illinois Bell's
operating expenses."
Shortly thereafter, in Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, the Court settled the question of how a commission was to obtain the
information about an affiliated entity's costs of service. 89 The Court affirmed
the Ohio Public Utilities Commission's valuation of property of affiliated producing and transportation companies, as though they were part of the local
public utility, because the affiliated companies were not dealing at arm's
length.90 The Court concluded that, "in view of the close relation between the
affiliated companies," the burden was upon the utility to sustain the fairness of
a management contract between Dayton Power and Columbia Engineering and
Management Company, a company affiliated with Dayton Power.9 1
1. Despite Commission DisallowanceAuthority, the Ambiguous
Limitations of Southwestern Bell Remain
By the early 1930s, the Supreme Court's decisions had thus evolved. The
Court recognized the dangers of interaffiliate contracts caused by the absence
of arm's length negotiations between a public utility and its affiliates and concluded that commissions were entitled to closely scrutinize such transactions.
Utility companies had the burden of showing that contracts between a public
utility and its affiliates were fair, and commissions could determine the proper
allocation to the utility of those costs incurred by the providing entity that were
deemed to be reasonable.9 2 The Court, however, left in place its ill-defined
85 Smith v. I11.
Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 143 (1930) rev'd on other grounds sub nom.

Lindheimer v. I11.
Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151 (1934).
86 Id.
87
88
89
90

Id. at 153.
Id. at 154, 157.
Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 292 U.S. 290 (1934).
Id. at 295.

91

Id. at 307.

92 This does not apply when an affiliate charges FERC-approved rates for wholesale utility

services, such as wholesale electric power, because a state utility commission's regulation is
preempted by FERC in such instances. See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476
U.S. 953, 971 (1986); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
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limitation on commission authority over interaffiliate transactions with its
warning that 93a utility commission was not "the financial manager of the
'
corporation."
2. Disallowance of UnreasonableServicing Fees is Insufficient to
Prevent Payment of Excessive Fees to Affiliates
States began to codify the doctrine of Smith, placing the burden on the
operating company to prove the fees entered as operating expenses were reasonable in view of the cost to the service-providing entity, thus assuring that
commissions had the authority to disallow those expenses determined to be
unreasonable when setting rates.9 4 Such provisions remain in place today, but
provide, at best, indirect control over servicing contract fees, or other inappropriate charges against the operating company, because there is little a commission can do to curtail excessive interaffiliate payments outside the context of a
rate hearing. 95 That is, disallowance of servicing contract fees can only contribute toward a decrease in rates if a rate case is held. This is unlikely given
the time and expense of a rate case and the reality that it is up to the utility
company to present a rate case to the commission. For example, in Duke
Energy's recent agreement to refund $25 million to its electric customers to
settle allegations that it had transferred expenses of its non-utility affiliates into
its regulated utilities, the chairwoman of the South Carolina Public Service
Commission reported that neither of Duke's utilities had been subjected to a
rate case in more than a decade. 96 She reported that the inappropriate transactions might not have been discovered had it not been for an inside tip, which
led to an independent audit that uncovered the shift. 97
Even if a commission disallows some portion of the servicing fees or other
charges, and subsequently reduces a utility's rates, the utility can still fully
compensate the holding company for the agreed-upon fees by reducing other
operating expenditures. 9 8 As observed by one commentator, "such indirect
control seems a dubious method of preventing the payment of excessive fees to
affiliates," which is detrimental to consumers and investors alike.9 9 Nor does
such authority prevent a holding company from shifting huge amounts of debt
or loan repayment responsibilities to public utilities, such as was attempted by
" Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289
(1923).
9 The Servicing Function, supra note 7, at 985 n.122 (the states that codified such provisions by 1936 were New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Louisiana).
91 Id. at 986 (explaining that the disallowance of servicing contract fees as a method of
stopping excessive payments to affiliates was unlikely to be effective unless exercised in a
rate case, which was unlikely to occur solely for the purpose of reducing servicing fees
because of the time and expense of litigating a rate case. If servicing fees were disallowed
during a rate case, such disallowance could increase the utility's net operating revenue and
improve the utility's return, thus subjecting the utility to lower rates, which would ultimately
decrease income and force a comparable reduction in expenditures).
96 Smith, supra note 8.
97 Id.
98 The Servicing Function, supra note 7, at 986.
99 Id.
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WRI. To prevent such shifts, commissions need more direct control over the
transactions between public utilities and their affiliates.
III.

STATE LAW AUTHORIZES COMMISSIONS TO DIRECTLY CONTROL
SOME INTERAFFILIATE CONTRACTS

A.

State "Affiliated Interests" Statutes

In response to reports by the Federal Trade Commission and investigatory
bodies in New York and Massachusetts that holding companies were realizing
huge profits from fees on servicing contracts, 00 many states granted commissions direct statutory authority over interaffiliate transactions' 0 ' through "affiliated interests statutes."' 0 2 "Affiliated interests statutes extend public service
commission jurisdiction by giving commissions authority to monitor transactions between utilities and corporations or persons who have limited authority
over the utility. 'Authority' is statutorily defined; it generally means control
through stock ownership."' 0 3 These statutes varied in the degree of control
over affiliate transactions provided to each state commission. Some statutes
required affirmative approval prior to the contract becoming effective,"0 while
others gave commissions the power to restrain payments for unapproved contracts per court order. 10 5 Other statutes declared unapproved contracts void'0 6
and some empowered the commission to inspect the affiliate's books and
records.' 0 7 Oregon enacted a statute that gave its commission the strongest
possible authority, in that it considered the affiliate providing the service as a
public utility for purposes of regulation. 10 8
Many state commissions still rely on these affiliated interests statutes as
the primary tool to regulate interaffiliate transactions. This is despite a resurgence of utility diversification activities in the 1980s that posed additional challenges to commissions in controlling inappropriate interaffiliate transactions.' 0 9
" Id. (referring to FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, UTILITY CORPORATIONS, S. Doc. No. 92,
70th CONG., IST SESS. (1928-36); REPORT OF N.Y. COMM'N ON REVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMM'N LAW

(1930);

REPORT OF MASS. SPECIAL COMM'N ON CONTROL AND CONDUCT

OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1930)).
101 Id. at 986-87 n.127 (listing statutes from New York, Alabama, Oregon, Washington,

Wisconsin, New Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Pennsylvania, Virginia, New Hampshire,
Arkansas, Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts and Connecticut).
102 Fickinger, supra note 3, at 93.
103 id.

"o The Servicing Function, supra note 7, at 987 n.130 (referencing statutes in Illinois,

Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin).
105 Id. at 987 n.131 (noting statutes in New Hampshire and Wisconsin).
106 Id. at 987 n.132 (referring to statutes in Illinois, Massachusetts and West Virginia).
107 Id. at 988 n.134 (referring to statutes in Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, New
Jersey, New York and Oregon).
108 Id. at 988.
109 Fickinger, supra note 3, at 92-95 n.41 (listing possible dangers of public utility holding
company diversification, such as managerial dilution as more talented managers are transferred to the more competitive non-utility operations, or profit-skimming from the utility to
the holding company; wrongful charges for non-utility goods or services and risks or losses
being absorbed by the utility while profits are diverted elsewhere; and diversion of retained
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One commentator observed that, as of 1982, few states had amended their public utility statutes beyond the affiliated interests statutes to assure that their
commissions were able to deal adequately with the consequences of

diversification. 110
New York's affiliated interests statute is representative of many state affiliated interests statutes. It provides
[n]o management, construction, engineering or similar contract, hereafter made, with
any affiliated interest .
shall be effective unless it shall first have been filed with
the commission, and no charge for any such management, construction, engineering
or similar service, whether made pursuant to contract or otherwise, shall exceed the
reasonable cost of performing such service ...If it be found that any such contract is
not in the public interest, the commission, after investigation and a hearing, is hereby
authorized to disapprove such contract." 1

Some commentators criticized statutes, such as New York's, for not
requiring commissions to scrutinize every interaffiliate contract.' 12 More
expansive delegations of authority, however, have not always survived judicial
scrutiny. For example, Pennsylvania's original affiliated interests statute prohibited a public utility from making or modifying any contract without getting
prior commission approval. 1' 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the
statute to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, primarily
due to the lack of specific statutory guidelines required for approval of an interaffiliate transaction, other than a tenuous link to the commission's authority to
withdraw previously approved contracts if such withdrawal were in the public
interest.' 4 Even if that standard were applicable, the court concluded, "[t]he
phrase 'public interest' as used in this connection is 'a concept without ascertainable criterion"' and, as such, was "too vague and elastic to furnish a
standard."' "s
Despite this initial setback, Pennsylvania's statute was later amended to
require the prior written commission approval of an interaffiliate contract "only
earnings from the utility to more profitable ventures or the unequal division of assets attributable to the utility in favor of the non-regulated entity).
1'0 Id. at 94-95 nn.39, 40 (noting that only Connecticut and Maine had enacted statutes to
address diversification activity adequately. The note examined commission orders in four
states dealing with proposed utility diversification activity. The Illinois Commerce Commission concluded "it lacked jurisdiction over a utility holding company's maneuver calculated
to avoid the language of the Illinois regulatory statute." The Connecticut Public Service
Commission, which the author believed set an example for dealing equitably with diversification ex post, was unable to involve itself until the diversification was complete and ratepayers had been forced to absorb the costs of the diversification efforts. The New York
Public Service Commission avoided the jurisdictional question by "flatly ... refusing to
allow diversification through the holding company arrangement" while the Michigan Public
Service Commission was "unable to exercise jurisdiction over a utility's pre-divestiture conduct which resulted in the displacement of valuable utility assets.").
ll N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 110(3) (McKinney 2002).
112 The Servicing Function, supra note 7, at 987 n. 129 (referencing Legislation:Legislation
Extending Control Over Public Utility-Affiliates Contracts, 45 HARV. L. REV. 729, 733-34
(1932)).
113 1937 P.L. 1053 § 702, as amended by 1938 P.L. 44, 66 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1272 (1938)
(since repealed).
114 Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. Driscoll, 21 A.2d 912, 916 (Pa. 1941).
115 Id. at 915.
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if it shall clearly appear and be established upon investigation that [the contract] is reasonable and consistent with the public interest."' 16 The statute also
applied to a broad assortment of interaffiliate contracts for "management,
supervisory, construction, engineering, accounting, legal, financial, or similar
services" as well as contracts for "the purchase, sale, lease or exchange of any
property, right, or thing or for the furnishing of any service, property, right or
thing." ' 7 Notably, perhaps because of the Pennsylvania statute's specificity,
little other case law regarding the commission's authority over such transactions has developed.
B. Some Courts Narrowly Construe Commission Authority Over
Interaffiliate Transactions
1.

General Telephone Company of Upstate New York v. Lundy

Case law regarding commission authority over interaffiliate transactions,
however, has developed in other jurisdictions with less encompassing affiliated
interests statutes than Pennsylvania's. In General Telephone Co. of Upstate
New York v. Lundy," 8 the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the
commission was "powerless" to impair the obligation or otherwise invalidate
contracts between a public utility and its affiliated suppliers aside from those
types of contracts specifically delineated in New York's affiliated interests statute.'1 9 However, the court upheld the commission's power to investigate
prices charged by all affiliated suppliers, saying such power could be "fairly
implied" from the commission's rate making powers, despite the absence of an
express grant of legislative authority to conduct such inquiries. 2 ° The court
explained that for such interaffiliate contracts, "the commission does not
require the authority to invalidate contracts. All that is required - and, indeed,
all that is given - is the authority to disregard unwarranted payments to affiliates when calculating the 'just and reasonable' rates which the telephone company will be permitted to charge its subscribers."''
Observing that the
commission's rate-making power was not "'subservient to the discretion of (a
utility),' "122 the court concluded that when dealing with transactions between
affiliates, the commission not only had the right, but "the duty to scrutinize
(such) transactions closely"
to ascertain whether the prices charged by the affil123
iates were excessive.
2. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Public Utilities
Commission of California
The Lundy court's decision relied, in some measure, on an earlier decision
of the California Supreme Court in Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Pub116

1976 P.L. 1057 § 16, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102(b) (West 2002).

117

Id. at § 2102(a).

118 218 N.E.2d 274 (N.Y. 1966).
119 Id. at 278. See also N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 110(3) (McKinney 2002).
120 Id. at 278.
121 Id. (footnote omitted).
122
123

Id.
Id.
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lic Utilities Commission of California.2 4 The issue in Pacific Telephone was
whether the Public Utilities Commission of California had the authority to prescribe the terms upon which Pacific Telephone could contract with its parent,
AT&T.' 25 Acknowledging that transactions among affiliated entities had created "problems in regulation," the court noted that California, unlike other
states, had no affiliated interests statute.' 2 6 Consequently, the court held that
the commission could treat interaffiliate contracts differently than contracts
between non-affiliated entities "only to the extent the Legislature so provides or
to the extent that they are used as a device to defeat the exercise of powers the
'2 7
commission has been granted."'
In so deciding, the court rejected the commission's arguments that the
commission's authority over interaffiliate contracts could be fairly implied
from the powers the commission had been granted. 12 8 The court observed that,
in the absence of express statutory authority, a commission's control over contracts between affiliated corporations was generally limited to disallowing
excessive payments for the purpose of fixing rates,' 2 9 a proposition which
Pacific Telephone did not contest. 130
The court considered the commission's limit on how much Pacific Telephone could pay AT&T as an attempt by the commission to substitute its judgment for that of management as to the reasonable amount to be paid for the
contract and how it was to be computed.' 3 ' "Thus the commission [was] seeking to disregard the separate corporate entities, not to exercise more effectively
' 32
its existing jurisdiction, but to extend its jurisdiction."'
Decisions, such as Pacific Telephone, that limit commission authority to
disallowing excessive fees for rate setting purposes only, are, however, ineffective in preventing excessive payments to affiliates for the same reasons discussed in Part II(C)(2). Notably, the California Supreme Court revisited the
conclusions it reached in Pacific Telephone and found that later cases "cast
serious doubt on the continuing vitality of much of the reasoning in Pac.
,, 13 3
Tel.
C. Other Courts Rely on the Doctrine of Implied Powers to Construe
Commission Authority to Regulate Interaffiliate Transactions
As demonstrated by Pacific Telephone and Lundy, courts are sometimes
reluctant to find that there is commission jurisdiction over interaffiliate contracts absent specific legislative authority for the commission to police such
transactions in some manner.13 4 Such conclusions, however, seem to ignore
124
125
126
127
128
129

215 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1950).
443.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
130 Id. at
131Id.at
132 Id.
133

444.
447.
445.

446.
443.

446.

See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 670 P.2d 349, 353 (Cal. 1983).

See Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 215 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1950); Gen.
Tel. Co. of Upstate N.Y. v. Lundy, 218 N.E.2d 274 (N.Y. 1966).
134
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the doctrine of implied powers, which has been relied upon by many other
courts to broadly construe commission authority over interaffiliate transactions.
As explained by one commentator, the doctrine of implied powers means that
an administrative agency must have the power to put into effect the measures
necessary to achieve the desired end, regardless of whether the agency is
expressly delegated such power.' 3 5 As was explained, "[the larger the powers
conferred with regard to the ends, the larger the powers regularly to be implied
as to means."' 3 6 Since state public utility commissions have been granted
sweeping powers to regulate public utility companies, direct control of interaffiliate transactions can be seen as a necessary means of accomplishing the commissions' ultimate goal of protecting consumers from the ill effects of harmful
transactions. In applying the doctrine of implied powers to administrative
agencies, the United States Supreme Court also recognized that "[w]ithout a
doubt the [administrative agency] may not go beyond the words of the statute
properly construed, but they must be read in the light of its general purpose and
13 7
applied with a view to effectuate such purpose."'
1.

International Railway v. Public Service Commission

Using the doctrine of implied powers, the New York Supreme Court
broadly construed the New York commission's authority to control contracts
between a public utility and its affiliates, and affirmed the commission's decision to order the cancellation of a management contract between International
Railway and Mitten Management, Inc.' 38 Mitten controlled International Railway's system and properties.139 The contract in question provided that Mitten
would have "complete charge and supervision of the business, system and
properties" of International Railway, subject only to the supervision of the
board of directors of International Railway, which Mitten also dominated. 4 °
The commission concluded that the contract was unnecessary for the proper
management of the corporation and was an unneeded
expense that was not in
4
the public interest, and ordered it to be cancelled.' 1
The court found that the commission had not unlawfully invaded management's prerogatives or overruled management decision's regarding the company's affairs in ordering cancellation of the contract.' 42 The court held that
the commission had the implied authority under its public interest standard to
cancel the contract, as a "necessary concomitant" of the power to disapprove,
which was expressly stated in the statute. 143 The court pointed out that mere
disapproval of the contract was not supported by a realistic view of the purpose
of the statute, which, per the legislative history, was "to restrain contracts
131 Hans J. Morgenthau, Implied Regulatory Powers in Administrative Law, 28 IOWA L.
REV.

575, 601-02 (footnote omitted).

136

Id.

117

Fed. Trade Comm'n v. W. Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554, 559 (1926).

138 Int'l Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 36 N.Y.S.2d 125, 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942).
139 Id.
140 Id. at
141
142

128-29.
Id. at 135.
Id.

143 Id. at 132. See also N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW. § 110(3) (McKinney 2002).
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between public utilities and affiliates when such contracts were found to be
144
contrary to the public interest."'
2.

New York Telephone v. Public Service Commission of New York
45
In New York Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York,1
the New York Court of Appeals also took an expansive view of the commission's authority over management contracts between a public utility and its
affiliate. The court rejected New York Telephone's argument that the term
"management contract" within New York's public service law 1 4 6 meant only
"the all-encompassing power to run the local operating company's business
lock-stock-and-barrel."' 47 The court held that a directory publishing agreement
("DPA") between the telephone company and its affiliate was subject to the
commission's approval as a management contract 48 because the affiliate had
been given total control and responsibility for managing New York Telephone's directory business.' 4 9
The court found nothing in the statute or the legislative history that supported New York Telephone's narrow construction, nor did the statute include
a precise definition for the term management.150 The court explained that
while the impetus for passing the legislation in the first place had been public
utility holding company abuses of servicing contracts, the primarypurpose of
the legislation was to "prevent the utilities from insulating themselves from
regulatory control through these contractual devices so that they could charge
large fees 'at the expense of the operating company and ultimately the consumer.' """1 The legislature's concern, the court concluded, was with enriching
utility owners at the expense of ratepayers through all types of management
contracts, not just the lock-stock-and-barrel type.' 5 2 The interpretation advocated by New York Telephone, the court said, would "frustrate the very ameliorative purpose of the legislation and should be avoided."' 53
3. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corporation v. Tennessee
Regulatory Authority
In BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Tennessee Regulatory
Authority, a case with issues similar to those in New York Telephone, the Tennessee Supreme Court went even further and concluded the Tennessee Regulatory Authority ("TRA") had direct jurisdiction over an advertising company
that had been assigned the responsibility for BellSouth's directory services. 14
144

Id.

145 N.Y. Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 530 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1988).
146 See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 110(3) (McKinney 2002).
147 N.Y Tel., 530 N.E.2d at 847.
148 Id. at 845.
149 Id. at 848.
150 Id.
i1 Id. at 847 (quoting REPORT OF N. Y. COMM'N ON REVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICE
LAW, 1930 N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 75, at 63 (Feb. 23, 1930)).
152

153
154

COMM'N

Id.
Id. at 848.

BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Tenn. Regulatory Auth., 79 S.W.3d 506, 516 (Tenn.

2002).
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The case began when the TRA ordered the advertising company, an affiliate of
the regulated BellSouth Telephone Company, to provide competing telephone
companies the opportunity to contract for their names and logos to appear on
the telephone directory under the same terms and conditions that the advertising company had provided to BellSouth.' 5 5
In reaching its decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that a
regulatory body, such as the Public Service Commission, was "not bound in all
instances to observe corporate charters and the form of corporate structure or
stock ownership in regulating a public utility" and, to obtain accurate information as to revenues and expenses for the purposes of determining rates, the
'
commission could "consider entire operating systems of utility companies." 156
To do otherwise would allow the regulated utility, "through the device of holding companies, spin-offs, or other corporate arrangements to place the cream of
a utility market in the hands of a parent or an affiliate, and to strip the marketing area of a regulated subsidiary of its most profitable customers." '5 7
Applying this reasoning, the court concluded that TRA had jurisdiction
over the advertising affiliate.' 5 8 The court so concluded because BellSouth
delegated its responsibility over the white pages directories to its advertising
affiliate, and because the advertising affiliate had exclusive control over the
directories."19 To find otherwise would allow BellSouth to escape "the legal
responsibilities [to provide the names and logos of competing local exchange
telephone companies on the cover of the white page directories] thrust upon
i" 160

4. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Public Utilities
Commission of California (Carter, J. dissenting)
In his dissent in Pacific Telephone, a former California Supreme Court
Justice also offered persuasive arguments for applying the doctrine of implied
powers to broadly interpret commission authority over interaffiliate transactions. 16 1 Justice Carter correctly placed greater emphasis on the implied powers of the conmission under California's Public Utilities Act for finding that
the commission did have the authority necessary to regulate interaffiliate contracts, even in the absence of express statutory authority to do so. 162 The commission's power extended over interaffiliate contracts, he argued, because the
commission was vested with the statutory authority to "supervise and regulate
every public utility in the state and to do all things, whether herein specifically
designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the
exercise of such power and jurisdiction." 163
155

Id. at 508.

Id. at 516 (quoting Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Nashville Gas Co., 551 S.W.2d 315,
319-20 (Tenn. 1977)).
151 Id. (quoting Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 551 S.W.2d at 321).
158 Id. at 516.
159 Id.
160 Id.
156

161

Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 215 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1950).

162

Id. at 450 (Carter. J., dissenting).
Id. (citing 1915 CAL. PUB. UTnL. AcT § 31; 2

163

DEERING'S CAL. GEN. LAWS,

Act 6386).
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Justice Carter argued that if a commission is authorized to take indirect
action through its subsequent disallowance of costs (i.e., disallow payment of
some or all of an interaffiliate contract's fees during a rate case as the majority
had concluded), the commission could surely take precautionary measures to
stop the contract in advance of it incurring the fees." 6 He pointed out that a
commission must have the authority to stop "a 'raid on the treasury of the
operating utility"' before it happened because customers would be negatively
affected if the utility became insolvent, 165 explaining:
an insolvent utility has no credit with which to obtain the capital necessary for the
continuous expansion for service demanded from a utility under modem conditions
and that operation of a utility by receivers seems usually to be66 thought to result in
higher operating expenses than would ordinarily be incurred.'

He urged that the commission be allowed to "of necessity . . . lock the

door before the horse is stolen."1 67 Such preventive action was justified with
interaffiliate contracts because the contracts were not made at arm's length or
in an open market. Instead, "[t]hey are between corporations, one of which is
controlled by the other. As such 6they are subject to suspicion and therefore
present dangerous potentialities."1 8
5.

Arizona Corporation Commission v. State ex rel. Woods

Other courts have been in agreement with Justice Carter's reasoning on
the question of a public utility commission's implied authority to regulate interaffiliate contracts. The Supreme Court of Arizona found the constitutionally
established Arizona Corporation Commission had the authority to promulgate
regulations that required public service corporations to report information
about, and obtain permission for, transactions with other affiliated organizations under its general ratemaking authority. 169 The court explained:
The Proposed Rules arguably prevent utilities from endangering their assets through
transactions with their affiliates. If such transactions damage a utility company's
assets or net worth, the company will have to seek higher rates for survival. Thus,
transactions with affiliated corporations could have a direct and devastating impact
on rates .

. .

. we believe the Commission's regulatory power permits it to require

information regarding and approval of, all transactions between a public service corstability and thus
poration and its affiliates that may significantly affect economic
17
impact the rates charged by a public service corporation. 0

The court found that the commission must be given the authority to prevent a utility from engaging in activities that "so adversely affect its financial
position that the ratepayers will have to make good the losses," and concluded
that giving the commission the authority to approve or disapprove of such
transactions in advance was the only "common-sense" way to do that. 17 ' The
164 Id. at 449.
165 Id. (citing Simpkins, supra note 61, at 58).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.

169 Ariz. Corp. Comm'n v. State ex rel. Woods, 830 P.2d 807, 818 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc).
170 Id. at 816.
171 Id. at 818.
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Court put it simply, saying: "the Commission
was given the power to lock the
17 2
barn door before the horse escapes."

D. The Arguments for Implying Commission Authority to Effectuate
Measures Necessary to Protect Consumers
The willingness of many courts to broadly construe a commission's
authority over interaffiliate contracts correctly recognizes such agreements are
"potent with possibilities adverse to the interests of the consumers"' 17 3 caused
by the absence of arm's length dealings between the parties on either side. The
almost boundless statutory power granting commissions broad authority to
supervise and regulate every public utility under their jurisdiction' 74 should
also be read as giving commissions the implied powers to directly regulate the
potentially dangerous transactions between a public utility and its affiliates.
This is especially true since many transactions, like those engaged in by Enron

and WRI, can impair a utility's financial stability or adversely affect consumers' rates. Broadly construing a commission's authority to encompass such
transactions addresses the "realities of administrative problems"' 7 5 inherent in
modem interaffiliate transactions and is consistent with the principle that "[t]he
larger the powers conferred with regard to the ends, the larger the powers regularly to be implied as to means."' 76 In so doing, courts can acknowledge the
realities of modem holding company transactions and allow commissions to
effectuate those measures necessary to achieve the desired legislative end of
protecting consumers from the negative effects of self-serving deals which otherwise would evade regulatory detection.
Given the realities of infrequent and utility-driven rate cases in the regulatory process, the only common sense way by which a utility commission can
prevent a public utility from engaging in transactions that will adversely affect
its financial position is through the authority to approve or disapprove such
172

Id.

171 Pac. Tel & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 215 P.2d 441, 450 (Cal. 1950) (Carter, J.,
dissenting).
174 See e.g., N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66(1) (McKinney 2002) ("The commission shall:
[hiave general supervision of all gas corporations and electric corporations under any general
or special law . . ."); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66(2) (McKinney 2002) ("The commission
shall: ...

investigate and examine the methods employed ...

in manufacturing, distributing

and supplying electricity ... and have the power to order such reasonable improvements as
will best promote the public interest, preserve the public health and protect those using such
gas or electricity..."); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66(5) (McKinney 2002) ("The commission
shall: [e]xamine all persons, corporations and municipalities under its supervision and keep
informed as to the methods, practices, regulations and property employed by them in the
transaction of their business. Whenever the commission shall be of opinion . . . that the
rates, charges or classifications or the acts or regulations of any such person, corporation or
municipality are unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential ... the
commission shall determine and prescribe the just and reasonable rates, charges and classifications thereafter to be in force for the service . . . and the just and reasonable acts and
regulations to be done and observed... ").
175 Morgenthau, supra note 135, at 575.
176 Id. at 601-02 (footnote omitted).
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transactions in advance.' 77 As Justice Carter correctly reasoned, commissions
unquestionably have the authority to deal with interaffiliate transactions indirectly, (i.e., disallow costs or disapprove them for rate making purposes afterthe-fact). 178 By construing commission authority to encompass approval or
disapproval of interaffiliate transactions in advance, courts1 79are simply allowing
commissions to lock the door before the horse is stolen.
IV. THE

INVASION OF MANAGEMENT DEFENSE SHOULD NOT APPLY
TO PUBLIC UTILITIES

A second difficulty with commission authority over interaffiliate transactions is that the commission, in taking action on such transactions, has invaded
the prerogatives of management.' 80 As explained in one law review article on
the subject, the term "invasion of management" generally means "the order is
illegal because it usurps the rights of ownership" or "regulation has exceeded
its proper limits."'' The underlying question posed by such an assertion is: to
of public utilities to
what extent did the legislature intend the management
82
issue?'
at
property
the
of
owners
the
with
remain
Unfortunately, there is little guidance to be gained from the Supreme
Court cases on this question. On the one hand, Munn v. Illinois seems to suggest that since the owner of utility property has submitted his property to the
control of the public for the common good, the legislature intended the owner
of the utility property to have very little management control over it (aside from
certain constitutional assurances regarding recovery of CoStS). 18 3 A commission, therefore, should be allowed to directly control those contracts between a
public utility and its affiliate that it finds to be contrary to the public interest.
At the other end of the spectrum lies the Supreme Court's ill-defined Lochnerera 184 admonition that, while a commission may regulate with a view to enforcing reasonable rates, it is not the owner of the public utility's property nor
"clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership.' 185
would seem to be limited to assurUnder this view, the commission's authority
86
ing that retail utility rates are reasonable. 1
17 See

Ariz. Corp. Comm'n v. State ex rel. Woods, 830 P.2d 807, 818 (Ariz. 1992) (en

banc).
178

Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 P.2d at 449 (Carter, J., dissenting).

179

Id.

180 Management Invaded - A Real or False Defense?, 5 STAN. L. REV. 110, 111 (1952)

[hereinafter Management Invaded].
181 Id. at 110, 117.
182 Id. at 117.
183 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
'8
See Moeller, supra note 5, at 358-59 nn.132, 135 (citing Lochner v. N. Y., 198 U.S. 45,
61 (1905)) (finding a New York labor statute to be unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment because it was "an illegal interference with the rights of individuals.., to make
contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they think best... "). Lochner "ushered in the
so-called Lochner era of economic substantive due process, which, in retrospect, appeared to
be hostile to state economic and social regulation." Id.
185 Missouri. ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289
(1923).
186 Management Invaded, supra note 180, at 117.
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One law review article suggested that generally worded grants of power to
commissions clearly refer only to those services and facilities in the area of
direct utility-consumer contact and observed that "commission orders are uni-

formly upheld when the managerial decision 'invaded"' is within areas of utility-consumer contact."' However, the article, which relied largely on the
California Supreme Court's reasoning in Pacific Telephone, said a commission's power to regulate is properly limited by invasion of management arguments when "a regulatory body has attempted to order 'how' a service or
facility is to be provided" as opposed to what kind of service is to be provided.' 88 Further, it also suggested that courts limit a commission's power to
regulate what services are provided when "no public necessity can be shown
[for the service] and the service is losing money."18' 9
A. The Invasion of Management Rationale Has Succumbed to Regulatory
Realism

1. General Telephone v. Public Utilities Commission
Since Pacific Telephone, however, cases not only in California but in
other jurisdictions as well, have "cast serious doubt[s] on the continuing vitality" of the "'invasion of management' rationale"' 9 ° and, consequently, some of
the propositions put forth in the law review article discussed above. As
explained by the California Supreme Court in General Telephone v. Public
Utilities Commission, thirty years after its decision in Pacific Telephone, "the

Pac. Tel. court's observations regarding the commission's power to control the
relationship between utilities and their parents or affiliates have succumbed to
regulatory realism."' 9 ' Regulatory realism means that courts approve of commission practices which refuse to recognize the distinction between public utili92
ties and their affiliates or parents for regulatory purposes. 1
General Telephone involved a challenge to a commission order that
directed the telephone company to solicit competitive bids for new switching
equipment in lieu of its usual practice of buying switching equipment from an
affiliate.' 93 In so ordering, the commission tied its directive to a finding that
General's telephone service was unsatisfactory and that the commission's order
was necessary to prevent General "from favoring GTE's manufacturing subsidiary to the detriment of the service General provides."' 94 General Telephone
Company, relying on Pacific Telephone, argued that the legislature had not
granted the commission the power to regulate the company's contracts; the
commission could not imply such powers under the commission's rate-making
authority because "[almost] every contract a utility makes is bound to affect its
rates and services"; and that "[the] determination of what is reasonable in con187
188
189

Id. at 118-119.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 123.

190 Gen. Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 670 P.2d 349, 353 (Cal. 1983).
191 Id. at 355.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 351.
194 Id.at 350 n.3.
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ducting the business of the utility is primarily the responsibility of
management."' 95
The court disagreed, noting that the invasion of management rationale
96

"now appears to be disfavored"'
and explained "[w]e have been unable to
locate a single case since Pac. Tel. in which this court has annulled a commission order based on this rationale."' 197 To the contrary, the court recounted its
affirmation of a commission order requiring Southern Pacific Railroad to furnish a particular type of passenger service, "even specifying the particular
equipment to be used, despite Southern Pacific's claim that the order was an
invasion of management." 198 The court also noted "the most conspicuous
example of an asserted but rejected claim of 'invasion of management... the commission's order requiring construction of a passenger station and terminal in Los Angeles ... in Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Railroad Com ... In that
case, the commission not only ordered the construction and specified the
amount to be spent, but provided plans for the station."' 9 9
"[A]s the 'invasion of management rationale' has waned, [the California
Supreme Court] ha[s] been more willing to permit regulatory bodies to exercise
powers not expressly stated in their mandate."2 00 Under its regulatory realism
paradigm, the court concluded that, although the commission could not treat
interaffiliate contracts differently than other contracts entered into by the utility
for conducting its business, it could refuse to recognize the distinction between
public utilities and their affiliates. 20 ' As an example, the court pointed to its
previous affirmation of commission orders wherein the commission looked
directly to the profits of the parent from sales to affiliates in calculating rate
"I

Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 215 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1950).

196 Gen. Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 670 P.2d 349, 354 n.10 (Cal. 1983).
197 Id.

"I Id. at 353-54 (citing S. Pac. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 260 P.2d 70, 79 (Cal. 1953))
(finding the Commission had express legislative authority to order changes in service and the
type of passenger cars to be used in providing such service, observing:
In exercising the powers ... granted it may not be disputed that the commission to some extent
invades the functions of management. But they are not necessarily unlawfully invaded. They are
subjected to the exercise of the police power of jhe state in the regulation of the public utility. It
is undoubtedly true that for the most part all lawful regulations of a public utility in the exercise
of the police power are to some degree an invasion of the managerial functions of the utility. In
the absence of such regulations the utility would be free to exercise all powers of management
otherwise within the law.
I See also Atchison Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 209 Cal. 460 (Cal. 1931) affd sub. nom
Id.
Atchison, T & S.F. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 283 U.S. 380 (1931) (ordering the
construction of, and specifying the amount to be spent for, a railroad station).
200 Id. at 354 (referring to Ralph's Grocery Co. v. Reimel, 69 Cal. 2d 172, 176 (Cal. 1968)
(concluding that the sole function of a court in determining whether an administrative rule
falls within the coverage of the delegated power is whether the agency "reasonably interpreted the legislative mandate"); Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d
458, 469-70 (Cal. 1979) (holding plaintiffs' allegations of arbitrary employment discrimination against homosexuals as a cause of action against the utility under the Public Utilities
Code; noting the state generally expects a public utility to conduct its affairs more like a
governmental entity than a private corporation; and concluding "[u]nder these circumstances, we believe the state cannot avoid responsibility for a utility's systematic business
practices and that a public utility may not properly claim prerogatives of 'private autonomy'
that may possibly attach to a purely private business enterprise").
201 Id. at 355.
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base20 2 and affirmed an earlier conclusion that the "'utility enterprise must be
viewed as a whole without regard to the separate corporate entities ...
,,'
The court also referenced a commission finding that two wholly owned subsidiaries of GT&E, "'are, in effect, different departments of one business enterprise, so there exists no incentive to real bargaining .. ..,
The court stopped short of expressly overturning Pacific Telephone.
Instead, the court distinguished Pacific Telephone and affirmed the commission's order because it involved direct utility-consumer contact - that is, telephone service to consumers could only be improved if General Telephone
could "be pried away from its dependence on the antiquated equipment being
manufactured by [its affiliate]. 2 0°5 Despite the court's failure in General Telephone to specifically decide whether the invasion of management rationale survived,20 6 there can be little doubt that if the rationale exists at all, it is
applicable only when the commission's action has "nothing to do with the
'relationship of the utility to the customer"' or does not "affect 'the manner in
which the utility provide[d] the affected services.' "207 Consistent with the law
review article's observations noted above, the "'management invaded' pejora20 8
tive has little application in the area of 'direct consumer-utility contact.' ,
'

2.

PNM Electric Services v. New Mexico Public Utility Commission

The California Supreme Court's view is consistent with the opinions of
other state courts. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in upholding
a commission order denying Public Service of New Mexico's applications to
provide optional electric and gas services, concluded that such denial did not
constitute an impermissible intrusion upon a management prerogative.20 9
Explaining that the commission's order was based upon the commission's statutory obligation to ensure that the utility did not engage in activities that could
harm its ability to provide service at just and reasonable rates, the court found
that the commission was well within its authority to require that the optional
services be carried out through unregulated subsidiaries.21 0 Although recognizing there were limits to a commission's ability to inject itself into the internal
management of a utility, the court rejected that argument as a basis for reversal
and found the invasion of management prohibition had "waned."'2 1' The court
Id. See Pac. Tel. & Tel Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 401 P.2d 353, 370 (Cal. 1965)
(affirming the determination by the commission that Western Electric was not entitled to a
return on its sales that was any higher than the return Pacific was entitled to earn on its
regulated operations).
203 Id. (citing L.A. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 497 P.2d 785, 795 (Cal. 1972)).
204 Id. (citing Decision No. 75873, 69 Cal. P.U.C. 601, 634-639 (1969)).
205 Id. at 355.
202

206

Id.

Id. at 356.
Id. See also Barnett Stepak v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 633, 646 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (noting that the invasion of management rationale, while "near terminal" in the
area of direct consumer-utility contact, has life in other areas, such as in fairness to disappearing minority interests when they would have no effect on rates or services) (internal
citations omitted).
209 PNM Elec. Servs. v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 961 P.2d 147, 150 (N.M. 1998).
210 Id. at 151.
211 Id. at 152.
207
208
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noted that commissions have "substantial latitude in protecting the public" and
that "commissions are generally empowered to act in areas seemingly reserved
to management prerogative where the regulated action is 'impressed with a
public interest.'" 2 12
3.

Arizona Corporation Commission v. State ex rel. Woods

In Arizona Corporation Commission v. State ex rel. Woods, the Arizona

Supreme Court concluded that the Arizona commission had the authority to
adopt rules governing interaffiliate transactions even in the absence of regulatory authority separate from its rate-making powers.2 13 The court also rejected
an argument that the commission had "no authority to become involved in management issues indirectly related to rates [such as proposing rules governing
interaffiliate transactions] because such involvement is not necessary in setting
rates.",2 1 4 The court concluded what was necessary in setting rates must be
interpreted in light of the commission's "range of legislative discretion ' 2 5 and
in accord with "the framers' intent of the Commission's function: to protect
2 6
consumers from abuse and overreaching by public service corporations." 1
The court was persuaded by the California Supreme Court's pronouncements
that "the utility enterprise must be viewed as a whole without regard to the
separate corporate entities . . ." and "[ft]he invasion of management arguments
fail to recognize the special relationship between affiliated companies and the
strong potential that transactions between affiliates will affect rates." 2 7 The
court continued that the intent of the framers was to "protect our citizens from
the results of speculation, mismanagement, and abuse of power" and that limiting the Commission's ratemaking power so that it could "do no more than raise
utility rates to cure the damage from [unwise] inter-company transactions"
would subvert that intent. 21 8 The court concluded that the proposed rules did
212

Id. (citing Pub. Serv. Co. v. State ex rel. Corp. Comm'n, 918 P.2d 733, 739 (Okla. 1996)

(quoting Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 672 P.2d 44, 44 (Okla. 1983)). It should be
noted that in Pub. Serv. Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court struck down a commission regulation which required an acquiring electric supplier to pass the costs of changing suppliers
onto the customer rather than allowing the company to make the decision whether to pass the
cost on or to absorb the cost. The court said the regulation in question was an improper
invasion of management because "how and who" should absorb the cost of a change in
electric suppliers was not within the realm of the Commission's authority, absent some overall public effect. Id. at 740. In coming to its decision, the Court relied upon its 1934 decision
in Lone Star Gas Co. v. Corp. Commission, wherein the Court held "[t]he powers of the
commission are to regulate, supervise and control the public service companies in their services and rates, but these powers do not extend to an invasion of the discretion vested in
corporate management. It does not include the power to approve or disapprove contracts
about to be entered into, nor to the approval or veto of expenditures proposed." Lone Star
Gas Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 39 P.2d 547, 553 (Okla. 1934).
213 Ariz. Corp. Comm'n v. State ex rel Woods, 830 P.2d 807, 818 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc).
214

Id. at 816.

Id. (quoting Simms v. Round Valley Light & Power Co., 294 P.2d 378, 384 (Ariz.
1956)) (explaining "[tihe commission in exercising its rate-making power of necessity has a
range of legislative discretion .... ) (internal cross-reference omitted).
216 Id.
217 Id. at 817 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 670 P.2d 349, 355 (Cal. 1983)).
215

218

Id.
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not "constitute an attempt to control the corporation rather than an attempt to
control rates."2 19
4. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corporation v. Tennessee
Regulatory Authority
Other state courts have also endorsed the regulatory realism paradigm put
forth in General Telephone. For example, in BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority, 22 0 the court concluded "the Public Service Commission is not bound in all instances to observe corporate
charters and the form of corporate structure or stock ownership in regulating a
'
public utility, and in fixing fair and reasonable rates for its operations. "221
5. In the Matter of Rochester Telephone Corporation v. Public Service
Commission and In the Matter of New York Telephone Company
v. Public Service Commission of New York
Courts have also affirmed commission decisions, which ignored the distinction between public utilities and their affiliates when imputing benefits
from an affiliate's business operations to the utility, when such benefits can be
linked to contributions made by ratepayers toward that affiliate's profits. For
instance, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed an order by the New York
commission to impute a two percent royalty, as revenue to Rochester Telephone Corporation from unregulated affiliates, to compensate ratepayers for
"improper cost-shifting" and the uncompensated use of the telephone company's name and reputation.22 2 In addition, the New York Court of Appeals
recently reversed the Appellate Division's annulment of a New York Commission order, which required New York Telephone Company to distribute the
intrastate portion of the proceeds of the sale of its communications research
facility 3 to the telephone company's ratepayers as a credit to its customers'
22
bills.
B.

An Abuse of Discretion Standard is an Ineffective Second Choice
1. Duquesne Light Company & Pennsylvania Power Company v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

Not all courts, however, have been willing to eviscerate the invasion of
management rationale as a defense to commission orders that are alleged to
have improperly intermeddled in management prerogatives. For example, in
Duquesne Light Co. & Pennsylvania Power Co. v. PennsylvaniaPublic Utility
Commission, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed two commission orders that established a market price-capping mechanism for the cost of
Id. at 818.
BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Tenn. Regulatory Auth., 79 S.W.3d 506 (Tenn.
2002).
221 Id. at 516 (citations omitted).
222 In re Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 660 N.E.2d 1112, 1114 (N.Y. 1995).
223 In re N.Y. Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 731 N.E.2d 1113, 1114 (N.Y. 2000).
219
220

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:164

coal purchased from certain mines.- 24 The companies argued that the commission's denial of the right to recover the cost of coal purchased from certain
mines interfered with the utilities' lawful management decisions in initiating
22 5
and continuing a mining project that was not found to be imprudent.
Acknowledging that there were limitations to the commission's authority to
"inject itself in the management of a public utility," the court nevertheless concluded that a commission may regulate utilities "where their actions affect the
public they serve. Of course, rates affect that public. Indeed, the Commission
226
has an ongoing duty to protect the public from unreasonable rates."
2. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Philadelphia Electric
Company
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, later tempered this opinion in
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Philadelphia Electric CO. 2 2 7 In
Philadelphia Electric, the commission and consumer advocate challenged an
order of the Commonwealth Court, which reversed a commission order denying a $57 million rate increase requested by the utility.2 28 In affirming the
lower court's ruling in part, and reversing it in part, the court explained that an
obvious corollary to the proposition that it is not within a public utility commission's province to interfere with the management of a utility unless an abuse of
discretion can be shown, is that "if there has been an abuse of managerial discretion, and the public interest has been adversely affected thereby, then the
Commission is empowered to intervene. "229
Despite the Pennsylvania courts' view that the invasion of management
rationale is still viable in a regulatory setting, the judicial approach to its use is
worthy of consideration for those who reject the conclusions in General Telephone. It is arguable that the Pennsylvania approach is more closely aligned
with the Supreme Court's utterance on the subject in Southwestern Bell, and
represents a more restrained approach to regulatory activism. It is unclear,
however, who would bear the burden of showing that the utility's action was an
abuse of discretion, or arbitrary, or how such an approach would protect ratepayers before the damage was done. As such, the Pennsylvania approach may
be no better than the well-settled principle that commissions may disallow
inappropriate operating expenses generated by interaffiliate contracts, which
will only result in a rate reduction if implemented as part of a rate case.
C.

The Arguments for Discarding the Invasion of Management Rationale

On the other hand, General Telephone and the decisions that are supportive of it, offer numerous valid reasons for courts to disregard the antiquated
invasion of management rationale when dealing with transactions between a
public utility and its affiliates. As observed in General Telephone, the invasion
224 Duquesne Light Co. & Pa. Power Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 507 A.2d 1274, 1281

(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
225 Id. at 1278.
226 Id. (citations omitted).
227 561 A.2d 1224, 1228 (Pa. 1989).
228 Id. at 1225.
229 Id. at 1226-27 (internal citations omitted).
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of management rationale is no longer viable in a jurisdiction where courts have
routinely affirmed commission orders that have directed utilities to take actions
normally reserved for management. Such is the situation in California where,
for example, in Southern Pacific, the California Supreme Court affirmed a
commission order to provide rail service to consumers by the use of a certain
kind of rail car.2 3° In Atchison Railway Company, the California Supreme
Court also affirmed a commission order to construct a new rail station, complete with plans for the station supplied by the commission. 23 Thus, in jurisdictions where the invasion of management rationale has not, in the past,
limited a commission's exercise of powers normally reserved for management
in deciding "how" a service is to be provided, the rationale cannot be a viable
defense in the future.
Further, the regulatory realism paradigm, embraced by a number of state
courts, allows a commission to disregard the distinction between a public utility
and its affiliates when looking at interaffiliate transactions, because there is no
"incentive to real bargaining" in such instances.23 2 As a result, courts have
rejected the invasion of management defense when commissions have (1)
looked at the profits of the parent or the affiliate in calculating rate base, (2)
construed affiliates as being subject to direct commission regulation when they
are performing obligations of the regulated entity, or (3) extended their authority over interaffiliate transactions in the absence of specific legislative authority
to do so.
As pointed out in General Telephone, almost all regulations put forth by a
public utilities commission can be said, in some way, to invade the prerogatives
of management. 233 However, such invasions are not necessarily unlawful so
long as the commission is exercising the police powers of the state in protecting
the public from mismanagement and the abuse of power that could result from
interaffiliate transactions negotiated in the absence of arm's length bargaining.
As correctly referenced in General Telephone, the state generally expects a
public utility to conduct its affairs more like a governmental entity than a private corporation. 234 "Under these circumstances ... a public utility may not
properly claim prerogatives of 'private autonomy' that may possibly attach to a
purely private business enterprise. 2 35
This concept is consistent with the proposition put forth in Munn v. Illinois, which provided that when a person commits property to a use in which
the public has an interest, that person has granted the public an interest in that
use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good.2 36
Legislatures have granted commissions broad supervisory powers to protect
consumers from abuse and overreaching by utilities. For example, the California commission is vested with vast regulatory powers to supervise and regulate
230 See S. Pac. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 260 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1953).
231 See Atchison Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 288 P. 775 (Cal. 1931) aff'd sub. nom Atchison,

T & S.F. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 283 U.S. 380 (1931).
232 Gen. Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 670 P.2d 349, 355 (Cal. 1983) (citation omitted).
233 S.Pac. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 260 P.2d 70, 79 (Cal. 1953).
234 Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pac. Tel & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 599 (Cal. 1979).
235 Id.
236 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
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its jurisdictional utilities and "to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction."2'37 By implication, therefore, any action
that impacts a utility's ability to provide reliable service to its customers at
reasonable rates is properly within the commission's jurisdiction. This is particularly true of transactions between a pubic utility and its affiliates, because
such arrangements lack arm's length negotiations and are thus "subject to suspicion and

. . .

present dangerous potentialities. '"238

Lastly, as observed in General Telephone, invasion of management can
only apply to commission decisions that do not involve direct utility-customer
contact or affect the utility's ability to serve the public efficiently at reasonable
rates.2 39 As noted by the California Supreme Court in Pacific Telephone, however, "[a]lmost every contract a utility makes is bound to affect its rates and
services. '"24 ° Likewise, almost every interaffiliate transaction is bound to affect
a utility's rates or services. In view of broad commission authority to regulate
the rates and services of public utilities, and the growing acceptance of the
principle that the invasion of management rationale has little application in the
area of direct consumer-utility contact, there can be very few legitimate assertions that commissions invade the prerogatives of management when directly
regulating transactions between public utilities and their affiliates.
V.

CONCLUSION

The standard established by the Supreme Court in Smith, which allows
commissions to investigate the cost incurred by an affiliate in providing a service to a public utility and disallow any portion of it deemed to be unreasonable, provides public utility commissions indirect authority over interaffiliate
transactions, but is "a dubious method of preventing the payment of excessive
fees to affiliates." 2 4 ' Moreover, modern interaffiliate transactions have gone
far beyond the simple act of overcharging a public utility and thus inflating its
operating costs. As demonstrated by the actions of Enron and WRI, "intercorporate dealings.., of public utilities can have disastrous consequences for the
economic viability of the entire enterprise, and ... such misfortunes are visited
24 2
not only on the stockholders of the company but the ratepayers of the state."
As noted by one commentator, "absent regulatory oversight, it is not clear how
ratepayers can be protected from holding company accounting abuses such as
unrecorded cross-subsidization among subsidiaries. 2 4 3
The challenge today is for legislatures and courts to recognize that public
utility commissions must have the authority to not only disallow excessive
operating expenditures caused by improper interaffiliate transactions, but to
guard against other financial pressures being placed upon utilities. The call for
237 Pac. Tel & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 215 P.2d 441, 450 (Cal. 1950)

(Carter, J., dissenting).

Id.
239 Gen. Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 670 P.2d 349, 356 (Cal. 1983).
240 Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 P.2d at 445.
241 The Servicing Function, supra note 7, at 986.
242 Ariz. Corp. Comm'n v. State ex rel Woods, 830 P.2d 807, 817 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc).
243 Id. (citing Fickinger, supra note 3, at 96).
238

Fall 2003]

SHUTTING THE BARN DOOR

"[l]egislators [to] . . . recognize that public service commission jurisdiction

should extend comprehensively over public utility holding companies and their
non-utility subsidiaries' '24 is as urgent today as it has been in the past.
Even in the absence of a specific statutory provision clarifying a commission's authority over interaffiliate transactions, however, the general statutes
authorizing commissions to regulate the activities of public utilities can, and
should, be construed to provide commissions with the necessary authority to
achieve the desired legislative end of protecting ratepayers from abusive interaffiliate transactions. Such transactions have a great potential to harm ratepayers because they are formed absent arm's length negotiations and are between
corporations that control one another. Public utility commissions, through the
doctrine of implied powers, should be able to control interaffiliate transactions
to achieve the desired legislative end of protecting consumers from the negative
side effects of self-serving deals that might otherwise evade regulatory detection. As argued by Justice Carter in Pacific Telephone, if a commission can
indirectly disapprove an interaffiliate transaction by disallowing it
in rates, it
245
should also be able to "lock the door before the horse is stolen.
Courts should disregard the invasion of management rationale for nullifying a commission's order, which was first introduced during a bygone era in
which the Supreme Court was hostile to state economic regulation. 24 6 In its
place stands the regulatory realism paradigm articulated by the California
Supreme Court, which allows commissions to ignore the distinctions between
public utilities and their affiliates or parents when evaluating interaffiliate
transactions.24 7 Further, regulated utilities must be viewed much more like
government entities than private entities and, as such, are not entitled to claim
the prerogatives of a privately held business. They have submitted to be controlled for the public good. The commission is the body designated by the
legislature to exercise the state's police power in this area and decide what is in
the public interest, not utility management. The invasion of management rationale is simply inapplicable to the vast majority of decisions made by public
utility commissions, because such decisions affect direct utility-consumer contact or a utility's ability to provide effective service at reasonable rates.24 8 The
invasion of management rationale, like a rusty old battle-axe that has seen better days, has no legitimate role to play in the judicial review of today's public
utility cases.

Fickinger, supra note 3, at 116.
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